The role of food standards on international trade: assessing the Brazilian beef chain by Luciana Marques Vieira
 
 
Available online at 
http://www.anpad.org.br/bar 
 
BAR, v. 3, n. 1, art. 2, p. 17-30, Jan./June 2006   
 
 
The Role of Food Standards in International Trade: 
Assessing the Brazilian Beef Chain 
 
 
Luciana Marques Vieira* 
E-mail address: lmvieira@unisinos.br 
UNISINOS 
São Leopoldo, RS, Brazil 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this paper is to identify how Brazilian beef managers have responded to a rapid expansion and 
intensification of standards for beef exports. This issue relates to how some Brazilian beef exporters are 
strategically repositioning themselves in the supply chains. The literature of this study reviews global chain 
governance and international standards. The method uses case studies consisting of six medium and large scale 
beef exporters who export fresh beef to the European Union. The main findings describe the kinds of governance 
that stimulate upgrading and transferral of the best practices and, consequently, full compliance with mandatory 
standards. This study suggests that standards do matter for companies trying to increase international 
competitiveness. These results contribute an understanding of the Brazilian beef chain, and also of other supply 
chains coping with demanding and changing international markets. Managerial implications show the challenges 
facing Brazilian beef exporters in their efforts to sustain exports to the European Union and how they are using 
chain governance to improve their compliance with international standards and increase competitiveness.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Food standards are mandatory for international trade. Developing country exporters are penetrating 
the high value food market and increasing their market share as well as international competitiveness. 
In order to do so, they have to respond adequately to consumer concerns over quality and safety. This 
is particularly important to the beef sector, where recently a number of contaminations and outbreaks 
have negatively affected consumption. There are different standards covering food and food products: 
international public standards (such as Codex Alimentarius); the importer’s public standards, which 
may vary from country to country, foreign (importing) retailer’s standards, domestic public standards 
and domestic retailer’s standards. These standards have a full supply chain coverage in common to 
avoid risk. Most developing countries consider them as non tariff barriers to international trade. 
However, others have successfully expanded their exports of high value and value-added food 
products, complying with both public and private standards. 
This paper exemplifies this discussion, demonstrating how some Brazilian beef managers have 
responded to this rapid expansion and intensification of standards and have reached leadership on beef 
exports. It illustrates how Brazilian exporters are strategically repositioning themselves in the supply 
chains, based on the results of case studies of private and public standards within the Brazilian beef 
chain. The Brazilian beef industry is largely export oriented, with over US$ 1 billion having been 
exported between 2001 and 2002. Local companies are the main beef processors, unlike other food 
sub-sectors that are dominated by transnationals (Farina & Viegas, 2003; Jank et al., 2001). Brazil is 
also a big consumer market for beef (35.5 kg annually per capita, according to the United States 
Department of Agriculture - USDA). These results will contribute to an understanding of the Brazilian 
beef chain, but also other supply chains coping with demanding and changing international markets. 
Results will help in the formulation of adequate public policies regarding domestic regulations and to 
increase overall competitiveness. It also has managerial implications on the compliance with private 
and public standards. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the theoretical framework to be 
used (chain governance) as well as the literature on food standards. Section 3 briefly details the 
methodology of this research, while section 4 summarises its findings. Section 5 discusses the results 
and Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
This section reviews the literature on chain governance and food standards and uses it to create a 
framework for this study. It takes a developing country perspective to allow the assessment of gains 
and threats to Brazilian beef chains. Of fundamental importance is the identification of the agent 
responsible for the setting and monitoring of the standards, particularly when considering a global 
food chain (Masakure et al., 2004), with the participation of transnational companies.  
 
Global Commodity Chain 
 
Global chain management is an important and new area of recent research in international studies 
(Griffiths & Myers, 2005; Larson, 1992) and focuses on the governance of inter-firm relationships. A 
global chain consists of multiple business partners across countries, aiming to maximise the overall 
performance of their transnational companies. However, there is a lack of studies assessing the impact 
of global chain governance on developing country firms. As an alternative, the Global Commodity 
Chain Analysis (GCC) approach enables a clearer understanding of the complex issues of The Role of Food Standards in International Trade: Assessing the Brazilian Beef Chain 
BAR, v. 3, n. 1, art. 2, p. 17-30, Jan./June 2006    www.anpad.org.br/bar 
19
globalisation, and the prospects for wider economic growth and poverty reduction in developing 
countries. It does so by underlining the predominance of ‘buyer driven’ supply chains, where few 
leading retailers compete on non-price factors and impose exacting quality and food safety standards 
on suppliers. To date it has been applied in apparel (Gereffi, 1994; 1999) and recently to commodities 
(Dolan & Humphrey, 2000). 
Global Commodity Chain (GCC) is a method of analysis focusing on governance structure, power 
and the institutional framework within global production and the spread of manufacturing in 
developing countries. Gereffi (1994) differentiates two types of chain configuration and governance 
structure: producer driven and buyer driven. The first means a chain where large companies (usually 
transnational) co-ordinate the whole supply chain, characterised by capital and technology intensive 
industries such as automobiles and computers. Here, the main strategy is to attain economies of scale 
in manufacturing. Traditional examples of chain governors on producer-driven chains are automobile 
companies such as Ford and General Motors. Conversely, buyer-driven chains focus on the 
domination of retail companies and brand-name merchandise. These compete intensively against each 
other by continuing minor innovations to products and packaging, by the maintenance of strict quality 
criteria and by price. Traditional examples are UK supermarkets, Nike and Reebok (Gereffi, 1994). 
These companies are merchandisers that design or market the products that they sell. Gereffi (1994) 
recognises that both systems, the buyer and the producer driven, may be contrasting, but not mutually 
exclusive. Large companies play the role of the governor, creating and monitoring their own 
standards. They may be manufacturers detaining technological and production information (producer-
driven) or retailers or branded companies concentrating on the possession and “translation” of market 
information. Traditionally, the food industry has displayed the characteristics of the producer-driven 
chain, dominated by big processors (Nestle and Heinz, to name only two). However, the concentration 
of retailing is challenging the position of large processors. Big retailers are leading the food industry to 
become more buyer driven, especially due to the success of the own brand strategies. The governor of 
the chain is the establisher of the standards and should have sufficient size and capacity to monitor the 
standards, while the supplier should have the capacity to invest to meet the standards. Being a chain 
“governor” increases the responsibility of the retailer in the supply chain. Consequently, such 
supermarkets develop and aim to hold capabilities that can develop competing chains worldwide. 
Governance can be provided from within or from without the chain. Kaplinsky (2000) identifies 
three possible forms: legislative governance, where the basic rules are set that define the conditions 
for participation in the chain; judicial governance, which means an audit of performance and 
monitoring for compliance, and executive governance, a more proactive form of governance 
providing assistance to chain members to meet the conditions. The three categories are summarised in 
the table below: 
 
Table 1: Examples of Legislative, Judicial and Executive Governance 
 
Kinds of Governance  Exercised  by parties internal to 
chain 
Exercised by parties external to 
chain 
 
Legislative governance 
(related to international 
standards) 
 
*Setting standards for suppliers in 
relation to on-time deliveries, 
frequency of deliveries and quality 
 
*Environmental standards 
 
*Child labour standards 
 
Judicial governance 
(related to public national 
standards) 
 
*Monitoring the performance of 
suppliers in meeting these standards 
 
*Monitoring of labour standards by 
NGOs 
 
*Specialised firms monitoring 
conformance to ISO standards 
 
Executive governance 
(related 
 to private standards) 
*Supply Chain Management 
assisting suppliers to meet standards 
*Producer associations assisting 
members to meet these standards 
 
*Specialised service providers 
*Government industrial policy 
support 
   Source: adapted from Kaplinsky, 2000. Luciana Marques Vieira 
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The table above describes the different roles played by different agents in the establishment and/or 
monitoring of standards. It is fundamental to identify who is responsible for these tasks to understand 
chain dynamics. The governor can be considered the chain “strategist”. He is the one who determines 
the future of the chain. From the table above, obvious links can be seen between governance and 
standards. The international organisations responsible for the establishment of standards (such as 
World Trade Organisation) would exemplify legislative governance. Judicial governance is the 
enforcement of standards made by national governments (for example, MAPA - the Brazilian Ministry 
of Agriculture). Finally, executive governance relies on private standards. Governance can therefore 
be exercised in different ways and through different agents throughout the length of the entire food 
supply chain, depending on the standards present. Supply chains may have parts of the process co-
ordinated and controlled, while others are regulated by spot market transactions. Governance may 
transmit not only technical information (such as technical standards) but also market information 
which helps companies to forecast consumer trends and identify niche markets. This paper proposes 
that the form of chain governance may influence access to the international market and international 
competitiveness of an exporting company. 
 
Food Standards 
 
Standards are mandatory for international trade. Food standards are “rules of measurement 
established by regulation or authority” (Reardon et al., 2001) and are enforced by governments, food 
companies and retailers. Their aim is to assure the confidence of consumers in the food systems (from 
farm to table), but also increase the information available to the final consumer, enabling them to 
make informed decisions concerning the food they purchase. There are three different kinds of 
standards: namely process, product or information (Caswell, 2003), but most regulations use a 
combination of the three to regulate food processing and marketing. Briefly stated, process standards 
specify how the product should be produced; a product standard requires that the final product should 
have specific features; and last, information standards are concerned with labelling and other 
communications that go with the product.  
For the food processor and retailers, standards are important in differentiating and communicating 
product quality and safety to the consumers as well as being a competitive strategy. This has become a 
particularly important issue for developing countries, where the compliance with standards may be 
difficult, yet mandatory for trade (see Donovan et al, 2001; Henson & Loader, 2001; Farina & 
Reardon, 2000). Governments, international organisations and private companies try to ensure safety 
and quality by imposing compulsory minimum standards for a product and banning the sale of any 
item that does not comply with certain minimum criteria.   
The literature on food standards has focused on two analytical approaches (Jaffe & Henson, 2004). 
The first and more dominant approach focuses on mandatory standards and international standards 
ruled by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), broadening the standards of developed countries 
(United States, Japan and European Union). Most studies consider standards as barriers, highlighting 
the technical and managerial difficulties that developing countries face in compliance. The second 
approach emphasises the opportunities brought by standards and how developing countries can use 
those opportunities to their competitive advantage. This is provided especially by private standards 
such as industry codes of practice and quality assurance schemes.  
Research shows the need to improve Brazilian beef chain co-ordination as a key point (Aguiar & 
Lago da Silva, 2002; Ferreira et al., 2001; Michels et al., 2001; Silva & Batalha, 2000; Zylberstajn & 
Machado Filho, 2003). One of these studies (Aguiar & Lago da Silva, 2002) assesses the 
competitiveness of beef retail in Brazil. Results show that one of the issues that affects 
competitiveness in negative terms, according to the point of view of the retailer, is related to the 
inappropriate co-ordination of the chain, not using practices of supply chain management. This study 
suggests that to overcome the problems faced by retailers, they do not depend only on these, but on The Role of Food Standards in International Trade: Assessing the Brazilian Beef Chain 
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related firms and government. But the authors suggest that, due to its high degree of concentration, the 
retail link should be in charge of organising the beef chain in the domestic market. To a certain extent, 
this papers tests this suggestion on the context of international trade and the impact of standards, 
expanding the concept from co-ordination to governance. 
 
 
METHOD 
 
 
Case study is a popular method in applied social sciences (Sociology, Management and Business) 
and, recently, agricultural economists have been applying these methods (Sterns et al., 1998; Westgren 
& Zering, 1998), especially those researching the business management of food companies. Authors 
believe that agribusiness researchers are in a privileged position to be closer to industry than 
researchers of strategy behaviour in other industries. Westgren and Zering (1998, p. 419) affirm that 
when doing research, it is first important to define the event. When concerned with the event of price 
and income elasticities (what happened?), researchers use an econometric study of demand system to 
measure this. On the other hand, when examining the changes to organizational forms in evolving 
food markets (what is happening?), one may focus on alliances and contracts. They argue that case 
studies can illustrate the range of organizational forms and strategies used in an industry, without 
attempting to calculate their incidence.  
Here, cases are analysed sequentially, treating each one independently of the others, respecting its 
uniqueness so that the particularities may maximise the theoretical insight. As the analysis proceeds, 
the guiding theoretical notions are assessed in the light of the findings. Data can contradict or reveal 
previously unseen inadequacies in the theoretical notions guiding the research, providing a basis for 
reassessment or rejection. The data can also confirm the theory or may force us to create new 
hypotheses, adding detail to the theory and more fully specifying it.  
A multiple case-design analysing multiple units brings the advantage of being able to alternate the 
unit of analysis and avoid doubts about generalisation. It provides many differing observations of the 
phenomenon, each slightly different according to the context (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The 
objective of multiple case research is to see processes and outcomes across many cases, to understand 
how they are qualified by local conditions, and thereby to develop more sophisticated descriptions and 
more powerful explanations. 
This research involved three steps. The first step was the identification of industry participants and 
existing vertical or horizontal relationships using experts and secondary data to build a profile of the 
industry structure. Initially, the researcher conducted a rapid appraisal with an extensive gathering of 
secondary data (newspapers, technical magazines, academic studies) and nineteen semi-structured 
interviews with key informants (associations, academics and members of the Ministry of Agriculture). 
The objective was to learn more about the Brazilian beef chain.  
The second step (carried out between 2001 and 2002) was to identify and describe existing standards 
within selected export companies. Six exporters were selected following rapid appraisal because of 
their diversity and increasing export market share. Four European importers were also interviewed. 
The cases studies were conducted analysing documentation through focused interviews and direct 
observation (site visits). The documentation analysed was secondary data (such as codes of practice, 
journals, newspapers and technical magazines) and promotional brochures provided by the companies 
visited.  
The focused interviews took about two hours following a set of questions. When permitted, the 
interviews were recorded on tape. The sessions focused particularly on the following issues: activities 
carried out by the company; interactions with other links (suppliers, customers) and to what degree; 
input and output features; how this information is collected; how prices are determined; participation 
in schemes designed to control FMD (foot and mouth disease); implement of HACCP (Hazard Luciana Marques Vieira 
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Analysis and Critical Control Point); establishment of certification and traceability; and brand 
establishment, amongst others. 
The last step consisted of the analysis of the case studies. The reliability of the data was increased 
through the development of clearly conceptualised constructs and the use of multiple indicators. The 
in-depth interviews were conducted and analysed by the author, and then discussed with the key 
persons. To check for validity, after the case studies, a previous analysis was exposed to the key 
people and to some of the case study interviewees to confirm the information gathered. The use of 
multiple sources (in-depth interviews, annual reports, secondary data and direct observation) also 
aimed to improve the construct validity. Any claim was supported with multiple evidence when 
possible (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994). 
 
 
BRAZILIAN BEEF CHAIN 
 
 
This section begins by presenting and discussing the case studies. Following this, similar patterns of 
export companies are discussed. Then, a short analysis connects cases to the theoretical framework.  
 
Export Standards 
 
The cases consist of six medium and large scale beef exporters which export fresh beef to the EU. 
They can be characterised as family businesses located in Rio Grande do Sul and Mato Grosso do Sul 
They export an average of 40 to 60% of their total sales. The importers interviewed were four 
European Union buyers. Given that the individuals interviewed were not the decision makers, they 
preferred to focus on technical issues rather than strategy. 
Regarding standards, all beef exported to the EU must originate from animals that have never been 
treated with growth hormones. Shipments must be accompanied by a health certificate as evidence of 
this. Both the health certificate and the certificate of origin must be obtained from an inspector present 
in the exporting establishment. The competent authorities in the EU countries issue import licenses 
and communicate to the European Commission the quantity of license applications on a monthly basis.
 
Brazil has a small quota of 5 thousand tons/year of Hilton quota (standards for young steers imposed 
by the EU), paying a tax fee of 26% as opposed to the130% they would pay if they were not included 
in this quota. Currently, several importers have been asking for Hilton standards, even if the sales 
transaction is not included in the import quota. 
The importers interviewed had some experience with Brazilian beef purchases. All of them had been 
purchasing Brazilian beef for at least two years. Regarding compliance with standards, these importers 
pointed out some common mistakes among Brazilian exporters such as the lack of identification labels 
of the product on delivery, incorrect information on the label, or a wrong label, and errors in the 
sanitary certificate. These problems are related to information standards.  
The EU importers rely on the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture (MAPA) inspection system to 
control safety, although they inspect the processing plants personally two to four times per year. Table 
2 presents the main controls in export prescribed by international organisms and enforced by MAPA. 
All beef exporters have to fully comply with them. The Role of Food Standards in International Trade: Assessing the Brazilian Beef Chain 
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Table 2: Export-driven Standards 
 
Attributes Public  Standards 
Beef Production  The use of any source of animal protein when feeding ruminants is forbidden. 
Animal Welfare  none 
Traceability  The Brazilian System of Identification and Certification of Bovine Origin 
(SISBOV) is an identification system for the registration of bovine livestock, 
involving the individual identification of the animal on farms and processing plants, 
an animal passport and the creation of a data base. MAPA recognises certifying 
bodies as responsible for registration, data transmission and inspection. 
Food Safety  Ante mortem (before slaughter) inspection to detect any diseases. 
Post-mortem tests after the slaughter, checking: the animal’s organs (foot, head and 
tongue, kidney, among others) and age (teeth). After these tests, the carcass receives 
a stamp confirming the inspection, then it is cleaned and maintained in cold storage. 
Pathogens/toxins  Beef to be commercialised should be maintained in the chilled room at a 
temperature of around 4°C. Delivery should be made below the temperature of 7°C.  
Carcass specification  Brazil has not yet implemented a classification of carcasses according to quality.  
Target animal  All animals under federal inspection intended for export. 
Source: interviews. 
The beef exporters are under constant inspection from the MAPA and this inspection system is 
considered equivalent between Brazil and the EU. Importers believe that the Brazilian regulation has 
been modernised and enforce the same issues as the EU regulation. 
 
HACCP 
 
Interviews showed that particularly relevant to the beef export are the implementation of HACCP 
(Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point). Usually, HACCP is a process standard that consists of 
an internal team identifying critical control points throughout the process. Critical points in beef 
processing generally cover areas such as receiving raw materials, packaging materials, cleaning 
chemicals, process equipment, and temperature control of products during processing, chilling and 
freezing. Investment in microbiological testing is also undertaken. The beef processor must prove that 
control schemes are efficient and applied daily. Interviewees pointed out that HACCP, in the first 
instance, may increase costs to beef processors, especially in an industry with low margins such as 
beef processing, but costs vary with company size. Processors calculate that they spend 25% more on 
management time and machinery needed for compliance than those processors only supplying the 
domestic market. For large processors however, HACCP is a one-off expenditure and the mainly large 
scale production easily justifies an investment of this type. Caswell (2003) recognises that HACCP 
does not prescribe specific actions to be taken and the company is free to choose its own methods for 
hazard control. Each country can also enforce HACCP in different ways. The EU has mandated 
HACCP for all levels of the supply chain, while the US does so only for some specific chains (beef 
being one of them). For a processor in a developing country, the benefits of adopting HACCP come in 
the form of access to export markets, cost savings and safety improvements. 
 
Traceability 
 
Traceability is the “ability to maintain a credible custody of identification for animals or animal 
products through various steps within the food chain from the farm to the retailer” (CODEX, 2002). 
Before beef trade can occur, importing countries must be satisfied that the animal health status of the 
home country will be appropriately protected. However, traceability systems operating in the 
exporting and importing countries may differ. The EU, for example, has directives 1760/2000 
(17/07/2000) and 1825/2000 (25/08/2000) establishing a system for the identification and registration 
of bovine animals and the labelling of beef and beef products. The identification system to register 
bovines should consist of the individual identification of the animal, creation of a data base with cattle 
information, animal passports (for any animal movement) and individual registration of the animal. Luciana Marques Vieira 
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The EU requires that all exporting countries to the EU should comply with the same standards adopted 
by the block. The exporting country has the responsibility to objectively demonstrate how the 
proposed measure can guarantee safety. Interviews showed that this is the main constraint to full 
compliance with public standards. Exporters face the difficulty of obtaining information pertaining to 
the origin of the cattle because of the rejection by producers to adhere to traceability schemes. To 
sustain exports, the interviewees said that they vertically integrate (owning farms) or pay premium 
price to selected suppliers.  
 
Quality Assurance Schemes 
 
Quality assurance schemes are relatively new in Brazil. They have been implemented by 
transnational groups with their own brand products (such as Carrefour) or transnational food 
companies which select and upgrade suppliers (i.e. Nestle as described by Reardon & Farina, 2001). A 
quality assurance scheme (QAS) is  an organizational structure, procedures, processes and resources 
needed to implement quality assurance. This study identified only one case concerning beef. This QAS 
is led by a European retailer which provides an international certification allowing beef suppliers to 
supply locally and to the EU. These beef suppliers have to follow a strict code of practice and are 
inspected by the retailer or private vets. These standards are summarised in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Examples of Standards enforced by European Retailers 
 
Attributes  Private Standards  
Beef Production 
 
 
 
 
The supermarket only accepts extensive production. It sets standards and inspects the 
following issues: water management, labour, facilities, fences, tools, weight, and food 
and transport conditions. Ecologically friendly production (erosion control, 
maintenance of green areas and wild life and pasture rotation) and concern over 
animal welfare (regarding transport conditions, medicines, handling, among others). 
Producer must keep records. 
Target Animal  Animals with four teeth (average 30 months) having from 3 to 10 mm fat cover, half 
blood Hereford or Bradford; 
Linear conformation, sub convexes and convexes 
Female weight over 180 kg carcass 
Male weight over 200 kg carcass 
Traceability  Beef producers must have implemented a traceability system according to the 
SISBOV (MAPA’s regulation to export companies). 
Beef Processor  Special attention to carcass management regarding meat tenderness (maturation and 
cooling temperature according to PH down curve). Processor must keep records. 
Food Safety  Based on a strict traceability system (animal’s origin and feeding). Vet certifies the 
breed and checks the animal’s health before the slaughter. Then, the slaughter process 
is inspected. 
Sensory  50% British blood breed assures product tenderness and taste. 
Branding/labelling  The supermarket certifies the quality of the beef. Its label assures product compliance 
with the international standards and allows it to be sold in all shops of this 
international chain. 
Source: interviews. 
The EU retailer and the Brazilian beef exporter referred to the existence of detailed contracts, but 
they did not have permission to show the documents to the researcher. However, they mentioned that 
there are safeguards and sanctions for all the agents involved. The own-brand standards are explained 
in a code of practice that outlines all the best practices in beef production and processing. The 
standards are the same as those used in this supermarket’s home country, where concerns over mad 
cow disease and dioxins are high and affect consumer trust in beef consumption. Standards are varied 
and encompass process and product issues. The supermarket controls the whole production/process 
systems, and imposes sanctions on those not complying with the stricter standards.  The Role of Food Standards in International Trade: Assessing the Brazilian Beef Chain 
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The supermarket transfers the knowledge and practices from the home country. Good agricultural 
practices including animal welfare and environmental standards, relatively new to the Brazilian 
practices, are enforced. The supermarket provides training and assistance for good production and 
management practices, thereby upgrading their production systems. For the processors, compliance 
with these quality assurance scheme standards acts to improve their production, as well as quality, and 
increase their competitiveness. Although this initiative is recent, all the members interviewed appear 
satisfied and optimistic with the results achieved and the potential for future growth. The general 
satisfaction increases the level of institutional trust, relying on the supermarket’s reputation. As a 
result of this relationship, the exporter is becoming better qualified to supply branches in the EU. What 
is new in this case is that the own-brand scheme is advantageous to the suppliers involved, because 
they have an active participation in chain decisions.  
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
This section uses the findings to discuss the role and implications of public and private standards for 
companies already participating in, and those considering entering, international markets. In export 
chains, the majority of companies interviewed use public standards as the basis for their compliance. 
Brazilian regulations are constantly updated and include issues based on EU directives and CODEX 
related to the export driven chains. 
The evidence from rapid appraisal suggests export chains are characterised as being buyer driven 
with international wholesalers and retailers dictating “the rules of the game” (Gereffi, 1994). The 
governor is the link determining prices and standards, the positioning in the market, the distribution of 
functions between the components of the chain and inclusions or exclusions of the export market. In 
all cases studied, the buyers (wholesalers/retailers) are in charge of these issues.  
In beef export, enforcement and monitoring of standards by MAPA is limited because there is little 
inspection and no sanctions for non-compliance by importers. Regarding food standards, export 
companies comply with the basic forms, which are based on public standards as set out by the 
Brazilian government. Importers count on legislative governance (Kaplinsky, 2000), which is 
characterised by the setting of standards for transaction terms. Importers assume that the Brazilian 
public sector is responsible for monitoring the full processing while the importer only randomly 
inspects the final product. There is no knowledge transfer or assistance to the supplier concerning 
public standards. However, importers are concerned when beef is imported using their own brand and 
exercise executive governance. 
Governance draws attention to companies increasing the degree of chain co-ordination. This is 
crucial for the use of increasing product differentiation as marketing strategy by large companies. 
Governance also helps producers to meet standards. In this study, one case study presented an EU 
retailer that developed its own standards, including quality, food safety and environmental issues. 
These standards are based on international public and private (from their own home companies or 
benchmarking) standards and transfer of practices developed in their home country. It provides 
varying levels of technical assistance for producers and processors.  
This retailer tends to store information about the end consumer to set beef standards. The 
transmission of these standards can be advantageous to the processor in maintaining an important and 
large-scale marketing channel. Co-ordination using co-operation aims to promote the supermarket’s 
own brand and, consequently, its reputation. It is interesting to note that when the same processor 
supplies a customer supermarket with the processors’ own-brand, these transactions happen through 
the spot market. This demonstrates that advantages, such as preferential treatment, are not transferable 
for other transactions between these agents. They compete in the same way with other suppliers who 
do not have such a close relationship with the supermarket purchasers. Luciana Marques Vieira 
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The importance of compliance with public standards was experienced in 2001, when beef processors 
suffered export bans due to an outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the region where they are 
located. The outbreak contaminated the livestock of small beef producers who supplied local 
slaughterhouses. However, the ban showed the importance of integration in the chain and how the 
concern of one link can affect the whole. Since this experience, these processors are making efforts to 
develop long-term partnerships. 
Export food standards are split into two types: process monitoring and product compliance. 
Traceability emerges as the challenging process standard. When the MAPA enforced a traceability 
scheme in June 2001, a quality manager anticipated that beef processors would pay a market price for 
traceable cattle and a below market price on non-traceable cattle. This comment highlights how 
processors still consider compliance with standards as a top-down process. For example, companies 
(private standards) or countries (public standards) enforce the compliance of a certain standard, and 
local companies have to comply in full. Consequently, Brazilian beef processors demand traceable 
livestock and farmers need to cover this requirement. This leads to an adaptation problem as producers 
do receive neither information nor an incentive. Recently, several beef exporters have not been able to 
slaughter and export because there are no traceable cattle.  
Importers do not provide any kind of training or assistance and “learning by doing” has high costs. 
For example, beef processors themselves contracted international experts to learn how to comply with 
these standards according to different national and international legislation. Nevertheless, the 
improvements made at the processing plant and farms owned by the processor are also useful for the 
domestic market supply, although there is no premium price for safer beef internally. The main 
motivation for the implementation of a traceability scheme on the processor’s own farms is that the 
managers felt that traceability could not be assured when buying livestock at auctions. The availability 
of suppliers within the scheme is low. However, processors are likely to establish alliances with those 
producers who comply. 
All active exporters invested in HACCP in the late 1990s. The largest companies are willing to 
implement new quality control systems because they are a one-off expenditure and their large scale 
production justifies such an investment. One beef processor admitted that they will do whatever the 
importer wishes to “keep them happy”, unless it means losing money. In his experience, HACCP is an 
important and efficient tool for assuring some aspects of food safety. It is also seen as a “pro-active” 
system that includes several international regulations. 
International standards are restructuring relations and upstream functions as well as the behaviour of 
processors and producers. This has changed the power dynamics in the chains, with more power now 
vested in buyers who relegate functions upstream. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Exporting entails dynamic learning curve effects and upgrading capabilities (Gereffi, 1999). The 
imposition of international standards is resulting in organisational change, business approaches and 
behaviour, and has raised production standards which have positive spill over effects in local markets 
(Farina & Reardon, 2000). There is a move from competition towards co-operation, albeit a slow 
move. The application of standards entails the exercise and potential abuse of power by chain leaders. 
Regarding the use of GCC, it is consistent in analysing the emergence of a new global manufacturing 
system that goes beyond international trade to encompass co-ordinated but internationally dispersed 
production of beef (Raikes et al., 2000) The study highlights power, governance and the institutional 
framework. The market and non-market power (Dolan & Humphrey, 2000; Gereffi, 1994, 1999) 
involves the ability to affect market price outsource lower value-added activities and to retain or 
incorporate those with higher valued- added. However, the exploratory results of this study point out 
that power can also be paradoxical (Fearne, 1998; 228) in that, over time, buyers become more reliant The Role of Food Standards in International Trade: Assessing the Brazilian Beef Chain 
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on their suppliers who become the providers of brand integrity and have the capacity to innovate and 
add value. The institutional environment analysis shows that key agents within and outside the chain 
(government, certification bodies, retailer) can enforce contractual and performance obligations upon 
members upstream even against their will. The analysis of governance gives credence to the role of 
buyers in facilitating compliance with standards. However, this can be done through different forms of 
governance. A previous study of the Brazilian poultry chain relates the executive governance 
exercised by industry (producer-driven) as the main driver to international competitiveness (Nogueira, 
2004). Another recent study identified the exporter as the executive governor of small and medium 
sized fresh producers (Henson et al., 2005). However, this study is aligned with Dolan et al. (2000), 
who identified the role of retailer as more agile in developing and enforcing strict standards based on 
EU regulation and still not adopted by other countries. The transfer of these standards to firms located 
in developing countries is faster and more comprehensive, providing incentives for compliance. The 
other two forms of governance, legislative and judicial, seem less likely to sustain international 
competitiveness on sophisticated markets. Regulation is an important driver to organizational change 
though executive governance and may be more efficient and less time consuming for developing 
countries producers. 
This study agrees with previous studies that standards do matter for companies trying to increase 
their international competitiveness (Jaffe & Henson, 2004; Reardon & Farina, 2001). From a policy 
perspective, the study shows the challenges facing Brazilian beef exporters in their efforts to sustain 
exports to the EU. These difficulties are partially related to the need for the exporters to comply with 
the increasingly complex and demanding food safety and food quality standards that have become 
mandatory in markets. The findings show that while processors were managing to comply with 
product standards, compliance with process standards remained a problem for many beef processors. 
This suggests that processors were lacking the vital information regarding the nature and demands of 
these standards and the role of traceability and certification, as well as how product differentiation can 
yield a significant price and add market value to the processors. There is a need for the public and 
private sectors to work together in order to identify efficient and effective ways of enhancing capacity 
for compliance with standards. Private companies are already replacing the public sector on quality 
monitoring (Reardon & Farina, 2001). This should be promoted more widely in Brazil to enhance 
compliance with standards and supply chain integration. The creation of external agents facilitating the 
information flow to producers or, even better, to whole chains, would be a great achievement.  
The second implication concerns the need for more efficient inspection and control of food safety 
and quality regulation in the domestic market. The Brazilian regulations are updated and aligned to the 
recommendations of international organizations. However, a gap still remains between practices 
adopted for the export market and practices adopted locally. There are several factors that account for 
this. First, there is the lack of human capital and technology. Second, the market dictates no urgent 
need for safer and higher quality beef because consumers are not willing to pay. Third, there is not 
enough advertising/publicity to convince consumers of the benefits of safer, better quality beef. In this 
case, policies should take into account the success of supermarket strategies in offering differentiated 
products. Government should also increase the capacity of small firms and farms to meet the 
requirements implied by these private standards. This will prevent them from being excluded from the 
market. 
From a practical perspective, the results also have important implications for managers of the beef 
chains in particular and other chains in general. First, it was shown that chain governance as exercised 
by the supermarket is becoming a source of competitive advantage. Second, as shown by the literature 
in other chains (Hayes & Lence, 2002; Raynaud et al., 2002) exporters’ own-brands have grown 
significantly in recent years and have the capacity to encourage on greater competitiveness. This 
supply can be controlled by limiting membership of the producer group to a relatively small number of 
high-quality producers. Third, developed country consumers have been driving the changes in process 
and product standards through their insistence on safer and better quality food and traceability. 
Consumer pressures are also changing the structure, operations and functions of agents in supply Luciana Marques Vieira 
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chains, effectively the ‘rules of the game’. Processors must be able to monitor constantly and follow 
trends in international markets if they are to remain competitive.  
Further research is suggested on the increasing formation of global chains, where the presence of 
international players is quickly changing transaction features. These relationships tend to be 
hierarchical but are changing to become increasingly based on trust. The main challenge that the GCC 
poses is how to transfer this knowledge of stricter standards to alternative markets or increase 
bargaining power facing the global buyer. Another question is whether the `buyer-driven` remains 
over time or if Brazilian exporters can move up to a `producer-driven` chain and how this change can 
be achieved. 
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